priorauth.indocs

Incident response

The levers, ordered by blast radius, with the smallest one first.

#Escalation ladder

  1. 1 · Disable one agent for one practice
    The narrowest control. Other practices are unaffected and the rest of the fleet keeps working. No approval needed.
  2. 2 · Pause one agent, fleet-wide
    That agent stops everywhere. Requires a reason, which is recorded and read later.
  3. 3 · Suspend a channel
    Every practice arriving through that partner stops on its next call. Use when the concern is the route rather than the behaviour.
  4. 4 · Stop the fleet
    Every agent, every practice, immediately. One lever. Use it when you are not yet sure which of the above applies - it is cheap to reverse and the alternative is guessing under pressure.
  5. 5 · Suspend a tenant
    The practice cannot transact at all. This affects the practice's own staff, not only agents, so it is the last resort rather than the first.
Do not hesitate on step 4
Stopping is designed to be frictionless precisely so that it happens. Restarting requires a written reason, which is where the deliberation belongs.

#What to look at

  1. Agent operations → Reach. What could the agent in question have touched? Read down the columns: PHI, chart writes, payer transmission, ungated writes.
  2. Agent operations → Activity. What did it actually do, newest first, with the practice and the tool named.
  3. The audit spine. Filtered by correlation id if you have one. Every gateway call carries one.
  4. Release queue. Anything held is, by definition, not yet transmitted. That is often the good news.

#A guardrail stop is a different incident

If an agent shows as quarantined rather than paused, nobody stopped it - something tripped a wire while unobserved. Check what: a never-event in the eval suite, an exhausted error budget, or a spend ceiling. Resuming it returns it at L1 until its evals pass, so the condition has to be shown fixed rather than asserted.

#Questions the platform can answer directly

QuestionWhere
Did anything reach a payer?Audit, prior_auth.submitted events. Held gates never did.
Who released it?The audit record names the human, the payload hash and the time.
Did another practice see anything?Cross-tenant reads require a declared reason and are audited. There is no unaudited path.
What did the agent read?Every PHI read carries a purpose of use and the record touched.