Incident response
The levers, ordered by blast radius, with the smallest one first.
#Escalation ladder
- 1 · Disable one agent for one practiceThe narrowest control. Other practices are unaffected and the rest of the fleet keeps working. No approval needed.
- 2 · Pause one agent, fleet-wideThat agent stops everywhere. Requires a reason, which is recorded and read later.
- 3 · Suspend a channelEvery practice arriving through that partner stops on its next call. Use when the concern is the route rather than the behaviour.
- 4 · Stop the fleetEvery agent, every practice, immediately. One lever. Use it when you are not yet sure which of the above applies - it is cheap to reverse and the alternative is guessing under pressure.
- 5 · Suspend a tenantThe practice cannot transact at all. This affects the practice's own staff, not only agents, so it is the last resort rather than the first.
Do not hesitate on step 4
Stopping is designed to be frictionless precisely so that it happens. Restarting requires a written reason, which is where the deliberation belongs.
#What to look at
- Agent operations → Reach. What could the agent in question have touched? Read down the columns: PHI, chart writes, payer transmission, ungated writes.
- Agent operations → Activity. What did it actually do, newest first, with the practice and the tool named.
- The audit spine. Filtered by correlation id if you have one. Every gateway call carries one.
- Release queue. Anything held is, by definition, not yet transmitted. That is often the good news.
#A guardrail stop is a different incident
If an agent shows as quarantined rather than paused, nobody stopped it - something tripped a wire while unobserved. Check what: a never-event in the eval suite, an exhausted error budget, or a spend ceiling. Resuming it returns it at L1 until its evals pass, so the condition has to be shown fixed rather than asserted.
#Questions the platform can answer directly
| Question | Where |
|---|---|
| Did anything reach a payer? | Audit, prior_auth.submitted events. Held gates never did. |
| Who released it? | The audit record names the human, the payload hash and the time. |
| Did another practice see anything? | Cross-tenant reads require a declared reason and are audited. There is no unaudited path. |
| What did the agent read? | Every PHI read carries a purpose of use and the record touched. |